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Synonymy and Equivocation 
in Ockham's 
Mental Language 
P A U L  V I N C E N T  S P A D E  
IN I957 PETER GEACH ARGUED THAT Ockham's theory of mental language was too 
facile, that it made the grammar of mental language look too suspiciously like that of 
Latin: "He merely transfers features of Latin grammar to Mental, and then regards this 
as explaining why such features occur in Latin they are needed there if what we say 
inwardly in Mental is to be outwardly got across to others in Latin. But clearly nothing 
is explained at all. ''1 In 1970 John Trentman responded to this charge in a short article 
that has since become very influential. 2 In that article Trentman makes three claims 
among others: 
1. Ockham thought of mental language as a kind of stripped-down, "ideal" lan- 
guage, containing just those grammatical features that affect the truth condi- 
tions of mental sentences.3 
2. There can be no synonymy in mental language. 4 
3. There can be no equivocation in mental language. 5 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine each of these claims in turn. 6 In so doing we 
Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 102. See 
also the whole of sec. 23, pp. 101-6. 
2 "Ockham on Mental," Mind 79 (1970): 586--90. 
3 Ibid., p. 588: "I think Ockham's Mental can in many ways be compared to the now, I suppose, slightly 
old-fashioned ideal languages of twentieth-century philosophers. In distinguishing Mental from Latin or any 
spoken language, Ocldaam asks us to consider what would have to be the grammatical slructure of a language 
that was ideal for one purpose--for giving a true description of things." See also ibid., p. 589: "Ockham's real 
criterion, then, for admitting grammatical distinctions into Mental amounts to asking whether the distinctions 
in question would be necessary in an ideal language---ideal for a complete, true description of the world." 
4 Ibid., p. 588: "The existence of synonyms seems not to mark any distinction of the requisite kind so that 
in principle synonymous expressions can be regarded as reducible to a common mental equivalent." See also 
n. 5, below. 
5 Ibid.: "But just as verbal ornament gives rise to synonymy it also gives rise to equivocation, and neither 
can be usefully purged from a language suitable for conversation. Neither, however, serves any purpose in an 
ideal language of the sort envisaged. Indeed, the distinction between equivocal and univocal expressions has 
no point in Mental by the very nature of the case." 
6 The second and third claims are of special interest to me personally. For in my "Ockham's Distinctions 
between Absolute and Connotative Terms," Vivarium 13 (1975):55-76, I have given an account of Ockham's 
notion of connotative terms that relies in important respects on the claim that there is no synonymy in mental 
language. Again, on the basis of the third of the above claims, I have argued in my "Ockham's Rule of 
Supposition: Two Conflicts in His Theory," Vivarium 12 (1974):63-73, that there is a tension or "conflict" 
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shall discover that Ockham's  theory of  mental language is not so neat and tidy as might 
have been hoped. I shall argue that each of  Trentman's  three claims is "correct" in the 
sense that Ockham either explicitly holds it or else seems committed to holding it on the 
basis of  other features of  his thought. Nevertheless, I shall maintain, each of  these 
claims also leads to difficulties for Ockham, either (with respect to the first claim) 
because there are certain empirical,  linguistic reasons of  a sort Ockham would accept for 
rejecting the claim as it stands, or else (with respect to the second and third claims) 
because it conflicts with things Ockham says elsewhere. All  this suggests that Ockham 
had not completely thought out all the implications of  what he wanted to say about 
mental language. And that in turn suggests that, whatever is true for other authors, the 
theory of  mental language was perhaps not as central to Ockham's  own thinking as we 
have come to believe. 7 
L Perhaps Ockham's  clearest general statement of  his criterion for what goes into 
mental language occurs in Quodlibet 5, q. 8 ("Whether all the grammatical  accidents of  
spoken terms are applicable to mental ones?"), the text on which Trentman bases claim 
1. There Ockham puts his criterion in terms of  the "needs of  signification."s In a word, 
if a grammatical  feature of  spoken or written language can affect truth conditions, it is 
found in mental language; otherwise it is not. Let us call this "Ockham's  Criterion." 
Thus the distinction between nominative and genitive case in Latin has its counterpart in 
mental language since the truth conditions of  "Homo est homo" ("A man is a man"), 
which is true, differ from those of  "Homo est hominis" ("A man is a man ' s" ) ,  which is 
false if there are no slaves. On the other hand, the Latin distinction between first and 
second declension has no counterpart in mental language since as long as grammatical  
well-formedness (congruitas) is preserved it makes no difference to the truth conditions 
of  a sentence whether a given term occurring in it is in the first or the second declen- 
sion. As Ockham points out, an indication of this may be seen in the fact that synonym- 
ous nouns, which are intersubstitutable salva veritate (provided well-formedness is pre- 
served), may belong to different declensions. 9 
Ockham's  Criterion may be divided into two parts: (a) the positive claim that all 
grammatical  features of  spoken and written language that affect truth conditions are 
present also in mental language, and (b) the negative claim that all grammatical  features 
of  spoken and written language that do not affect truth conditions are not present in 
mental language. 
The positive part of  Ockham's  criterion in unacceptable. For unless Latin or some 
in Ockhara's theory of supposition. In neither paper, however, did I fully justify the claim on which my 
argument rested. That will be remedied here. 
7 See Trentman, "Ockham on Mental," p. 586: "Further, he thought mental language is really of prior 
importance to spoken or written language, and its structure is, in fact. the proper subject for the logician." 
8 William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem (Strasbourg, 1491) (Hain 11941), fol. 77ra: "Ad argumentum 
principale dico quod omne quod accidit termino mentali accidit termini vocali sed non e converso, quia aliqua 
accidunt terminis vocalibus propter necessitatem significationis et expressionis et ilia conveniunt terminis 
mentalibus, alia accidunt terminis vocalibus propter ornatum serrnonis, sicut synonyma, vel propter congrui- 
tatem, et illa non conveniunt terminis mentalibus." 
9 Ibid., conclusion 2, fol. 76vb. Geach appears to have taken this observation as Ockham's guiding idea: 
the grammatical features with respect to which synonyms may differ are not found in mental language; all 
others are (See Trentman, "Ockham on Mental," p. 597.) In fact, although this is a consequence of Ockham's 
Criterion, the Criterion itself is more deeply motivated, as Trentman argues. 
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other spoken or written language is to be given an arbitrarily privileged status (thus 
opening the door to Geach's criticism), Ockham's Criterion must treat them all on a par. 
Hence either (i) any truth-relevant grammatical feature found in e v e n  a s i n g l e  spoken or 
written language is found also in mental language, or else (ii) any such feature found in 
al l  spoken or written languages is found also in mental language. But neither alternative 
is satisfactory. Since different human languages frequently adopt a variety of grammati- 
cal devices to mark a given distinction (for instance, the difference between "John loves 
Mary" and "Mary loves John" is marked by word order in English but by case-inflection 
in Latin), alternative (i) would go beyond the "needs of signification" and clutter mental 
language with many grammatical devices any one of which suffices to mark the given 
distinction, but none of which is needed to do so. 
One may object that Ockham's Criterion requires less, that it requires only that the 
distinction marked by a truth-relevant grammatical feature in a spoken or written lan- 
guage be made also in mental language by s o m e  grammatical feature, although not 
necessarily by the same one, so that the needless multiplication of grammatical devices 
in mental language is avoided. But this is in effect to say no more than that spoken and 
written sentences with different truth conditions must correspond to mental sentences 
with different truth-relevant grammatical features--that is, with different truth condi- 
tions. That is so, but it is not what is wanted. It tells us which distinctions must be made 
in mental language, but it says nothing at all about how mental language makes them; it 
does not give us a single rule of mental grammar, but only what is to be accomplished 
by such rules. 
If  alternative (i) is unacceptable, alternative (ii) is little better. The grammatical diver- 
sity of spoken and written languages makes it very doubtful that there are any surface- 
level grammatical features common to them all.t~ Alternative (ii) is therefore very likely 
vacuous. Hence the positive part of Ockham's Criterion, on either of its two permitted 
readings, is either unworkable or uninformative. 
Nevertheless, the negative part of Ockham's Criterion may be accepted. Grammatical 
features that do not affect truth conditions in a spoken or written language do not appear 
in mental language. They occur in spoken or written language only for "decoration" or 
for the sake of "well-formedness" (for instance, agreement with resepct to gender), tl 
Thus mental language is a minimal language; whatever the positive features of its gram- 
mar, there is nothing there that goes beyond the "needs of signification," that is not 
needed for the making of truth-relevant distinctions. 
II .  We are now in a position to argue for the second of Trentman's claims, that 
there is no synonymy in mental language. As far as I know, Ockham asserts this explic- 
itly only once. 12 Several times, however, he makes a weaker claim that, if one is not 
careful, may be misread as saying more than it actually does. He frequently says that 
synonyms in spoken or written language correspond or are subordinated to the same 
concept or term of mental language so that the subordination relation does not map 
~0 The surface-structure features must be the one that are at stake. For the closest Ockham comes to the 
notion of a "deep structure" is mental language itself. 
H See above, n. 8. 
~2 See the last sentence of the text quoted above in n. 8. 
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conventional synonyms into mental synonyms.13 But this is not by itself sufficient to 
rule out mental synonymy across the board; it is only to say that mental synonyms, if 
there are any, are not the correlates of conventional synonyms. 
On the other hand, if Ockham does not explicitly assert Trentman's second claim as 
often as one would like, there are at least two other reasons to think both that he does 
accept it and that philosophically he ought to accept it. The first reason is just the 
acceptable, negative part of Ockham's criterion: grammatical features of spoken or writ- 
ten language that do not serve the "needs of signification" by affecting truth conditions 
are not present in mental grammar. That this rules out all synonymy in mental language 
seems to be the clear intention of Ockham's whole discussion in Quodlibet 5, q. 8, with 
its repeated statement that what is in mental language is there only because of the "needs 
of signification," not for the sake of "decoration" or "well-formedness," and that synon- 
ymy does not serve the "needs of signification." Indeed, the intention is so clear in this 
text that one may regard the denial of any mental synonymy as all but explicit there. 
Nevertheless, this first reason is perhaps the weaker of the two. For although the 
negative part of Ockham's Criterion is explicit in Quodlibet 5, q. 8, and is philosophi- 
cally relatively unproblematic, still we must remember that the discussion there also 
affirms the unsatisfactory positive claim that all truth-relevant features of spoken and 
written language are found too in mental language. Perhaps one ought not to be entirely 
confident of even the acceptable parts of a text in which the philosophically unobjection- 
able and the philosophically objectionable are so thoroughly intertwined. 
Whatever one thinks of these hesitations, the second and perhaps stronger reason for 
affirming Trentman's second claim is independent of these considerations. Ockham de- 
fines synonymy in the "broad" sense, which he says he will use, ~4 as follows: 
Broadly, those things are called synonyms that simply signify the same thing in all ways, so that 
nothing is in any way signified by the one unless it is signified by the other in the same way. 15 
I have argued elsewhere 16 that the "ways" (modes) of signifying here are best interpreted 
syntactically, so that a mental expression or concept signifies a thing x in a given syn- 
tactic mode m if and only if x is signified by some constituent simple categorematic 
concept or mental term occurring within that expression in the grammatical or syntacti- 
cal construction m (for instance, in the plural, in the passive voice, in a prepositional 
p h r a s e ,  e t c . ) .  17 It follows that synonymous mental expressions, signifying exactly the 
~3 E.g., Summa logicae, ed. Gedeon G61 and Stephen F. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan 
Institute, 1974), I, 3, 11. 20-22: "quia quidquid per orrmia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum 
exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo conceptuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet." See also 
Quodlibet 5, q. 8, conclusion 2, fol. 76vb: "nec vocibus synonymis correspondet pluralitas conceptuum"; 
and Quodlibet 5, q. 9, fol. 77rb: "sed multitudini nominum synonymorum in voce non correspondet pluralitas 
in mente"; and fol. 77vb: "licet talis pluralitas sit in voce non tamen in conceptu, quia multitudini nominum 
synonymorum non correspondet multitudo conceptuum." 
t4 Summa logicae, I, 6, 11. 15f.: "Isto secundo modo intendo uti in isto capitulo, et in multis aliis, hoc 
nomine 'synonyma'." 
~ Ibid., I1. 8-11: "Large dicuntur ilia synonyma quae simplicter idem significant omnibus modis, ita quod 
nihil aliquo modo significatur per unum quin eodem modo significetur per reliquum." Ockham says the same 
thing, in almost the same terms, in Quodlibet 5, q. 10, fol. 78ra. 
~6 Spade, "Ockham's Distinctions," pp. 68--69. (Although some of what is said in that article rests on the 
claim that there is no synonymy in mental language, the argument for the present point does not.) 
~7 Spoken or written expressions, then, signify x in mode m if and only if they are subordinated to a mental 
expression that signifies x in mode m. 
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same things in exactly the same ways, would have to consist of exactly the same simple 
categorematic concepts in exactly the same syntactical constructions. But that is to say 
that they would be identical,~S so that synonymy is ruled out in mental language after 
all. 
For these two reasons, therefore, I think we ought to take Ockham at his word on the 
one occasion when he explicitly affirms Trentman's  second claim. Nevertheless, he 
seems to deny it implicitly in at least one passage. In Quodlibet  5, q. 9 ("Whether 
mental names are distinguished like spoken names into concrete and abstract?"), Ock- 
ham argues that mental language possesses both the concrete term "white" and the ab- 
stract term "whiteness." The concrete term "white" is one of the paradigms of a conno- 
tative term; its nominal definition is "something having a whiteness. ''~9 If, therefore, 
mental language possesses the abstract term "whiteness," it certainly possesses the syn- 
tactic wherewithal to formulate the nominal definition of the concrete term "white." 
But, as I have argued elsewhere, 2~ Ockham's theory of connotation seems to hold that 
connotative terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions. Hence if both "white" 
and "whiteness" are included in the vocabulary of mental language, mental synonymy 
will be possible after all. 
Thus although the denial of synonymy is a legitimate part of Ockham's theory of 
mental language, he seems not to have fully realized its implications. If there is no 
synonymy in mental language, then mental names are not distinguished like spoken ones 
into concrete and abstract, despite what Ockham says in Quodlibet  5, q. 9. 21 
III .  In order to discuss Trentman's  third claim, that there can be no equivocation in 
mental language, some preliminary explanation of Ockham's theory of equivocation is 
required. Ockham, following Aristotle 22 and the tradition, 23 distinguished equivoca- 
tion, which pertains to ambiguous terms, from amphiboly, which pertains to ambiguous 
complex expressions and especially to ambiguous sentences. I shall discuss Trentman's  
third claim only with respect to equivocation proper, although many of the considera- 
ts Or at most differ numerically. That is, they would be two tokens of the same mental type. But this kind 
of plurality is not what is involved in synonymy. 
19 Summa logicae, I, 10, I1. 41-46: "Sicut est de hoc nomine 'album', ham 'album' habet definitionem 
exprimentem quid nominis, in qua una dictio ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo. Uncle si quaeras, quid 
significat hoc nomen 'album', dices quod illud idem quod ista oratio tota 'aliquid informatum albedine' vel 
'aliquid habens albedinem' ." 
20 Spade, "Ockham's Distinctions," sees. 7-9. The operative assumption in this argument is the principle I 
label Principle 9 in that paper (p. 67): "All the expressions expressing the quid nominis of a term t are 
synonymous if and only if t is itself synonymous with each of those expressions." Although Ockham never 
explicitly asserts that principle, I think it is legitimate to attribute it to him. See the discussion ibid. 
2~ It is significant, therefore, that Ockham's argument in the passage rests on faulty reasoning. See ibid., n. 
40. The issues raised by this passage are in fact more complicated, and whether it implies mental synonymy is 
in fact not so clear as I have suggested above. For a fuller discussion, see ibid. I refer to the matter here only 
to suggest that Ockham was perhaps not fully aware of the implications of his theory of mental language. 
22 Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi, 4, 165b30-166a23. 
23 E.g., William of Sherwood, Die lntroductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood ( t nach 1267), 
ed. Martin Grabmann (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1937), pp. 87-89; 
trans. Norman Kretzmarm, William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic (Minneapolis: University of Minne- 
sota Press, i966), pp. 135--40. See also Peter of Spain, Tractatus: Called Afterwards Summule logicales, ed 
L.M. De Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), tract VII, sees. 25-26; Lambert of Auxerre, Logica 
(Summa Lamberti), ed. Franco Alessio (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971), pp. 149-55. 
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tions raised below in connection with the third mode of equivocation will apply mutatis 
rautandis to amphiboly. In the end I think no ambiguity of any sort, whether of terms or 
of expressions, ought to be allowed in mental language. 
Ockham discusses equivocation in two main places in the Summa logicae, in I, 13, 
and in UI-4, 2-4.  24 The latter is the fuller treatment, although the former adds some 
considerations especially relevant to mental language. In III-4, 2, Ockham observes 
that an equivocal term is sometimes defined as one that has a diverse signfication in an 
expression. 25 Ockham argues that this definition will not do. First, although this is not 
his objection, the phrase "diverse signification" must be properly understood. For if one 
holds with Ockham that terms do not in general signify external natures or concepts in 
the mind but rather individuals, then a common term such as "man" can signify diverse 
th ings--namely ,  individual men---and yet be univocal. The phrase "diverse significa- 
tion" must therefore be read as meaning that the term is given more than one imposition 
at the same time. 
But even if "diverse signification" is correctly interpreted, Ockham finds the proposed 
definition insufficient. For, and this is his actual argument, sometimes equivocation 
occurs where there is no diversity of signification. His example is the sentence "Man is 
a noun" in which the term 'man '  is imposed to signify only individual men but may 
refer or supposit equivocally either for those individual men or for the spoken or written 
term "man. ''26 
As the example suggests, Ockham holds that the correct definition of equivocation 
must be in terms of supposition rather than signification. :7 In effect, a term is equivocal 
in a sentence if it can refer or stand or supposit there for diverse things in such a way 
that it supposits for the one and not the other. The last proviso is added because in the 
sentence "Every man is an animal" the term 'man '  supposits for diverse individual men, 
but it is not equivocal there since it supposits for all such men and not for some to the 
exclusion of others. On the other hand, in "Man is a species" the term "man,"  even 
though it is given only a single imposition, can supposit either for individual men and 
not for the concept "man" or for the concept and not for the individuals. 28 
Amphiboly is treated in !II-4, 5-7. The discussion of equivocation in Ockham's Expositio Praedicamen- 
torum, Ca. 1 (1 a 1-5: "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum') adds nothing relevant to our purposes. See his 
Expositio aurea (Bologna: Benedictus Hector Bononiensis, 1496), sign. g ii. (Hain 11950.) 
25 Lines 7-8: "Circa primum dicitur quod aequivocatio est diversa significatio alicuius termini positi in 
oratione." See William of Sherwood, lntroductiones in togicam, p. gT, 1.19 (Kretzmarm, p. 135); Lamber~ of 
Auxerre, Logica, p. 149. 
Summa logicae, I]]-4, 2, 11.9-14: "Sed istud non est bene dictum, nam non semper ubi est aequivoca- 
tio ibi est diversitas significationis. Bene enim potest esse aequivocatio in pure univoco; sicut ista propositio 
'homo est nomen' est distingnenda penes aequivocationem, etiam si hoc nomen 'homo' non significaret nisi 
unum, nec proprie nec improprie, et tamen hic non est diversa significatio." 
=,7 Ibid., II. 15-18: "Et ideo dicendum est quod aequivocatio magis proprie def'mitur sic: aequivocatio est 
multorum vocatio sub eadem voce vel sub eodem signo. Ut 'vocatio' non accipiatur hic pro significatione 
tantum sed magis pro suppositione seu pro alicuius positione." See also n. 28, below. 
Ibid., U. 30-36: "Sciendum tamen quod 'stare pro diversis' non facit aequivocationem, sed 'stare pro 
diversis, ira quod pro uno et non pro alio' facit aequivocationem. Sicut in ista 'omnis homo est animal', 
'homo' star pro diversis, et tamen non est aequivocatio; sexl in ista 'homo est species' Ix)test sic stare pro 
diversis, quia potest stare pro intentione et non pro re extra, vel potest stare pro re extra et non pro intentione, 
ira scilicet quod aliquis utatur hac voce pro uno et non pro alio." It seems to be intended here, although it is 
not explicitly said, that the term cannot be used to supposit for both the species and the individuals at once. 
That is, the alternatives are meant to be exclusive. 
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Ockham,  again fol lowing Aristotle and the tradition, 29 dist inguishes three modes of  
equivocat ion,  which I shall call (1) equivocat ion by  chance,  (2) equivocat ion by anal- 
ogy,  and (3) equivocat ion by  context.  These are defined as follows. 
A term is equivocal  in the first mode  (by chance) if  and only  if  it is g iven more  than 
one imposi t ion at the same t ime in such a way that the imposi t ions are independent  of  
one another.  3~ The last clause dist inguishes equivocat ion by chance from equivocat ion 
by analogy,  as we shall see. An  example may  be found in the term "dog,"  which is both 
imposed to signify canine  animals  and independent ly  imposed to signify the constella- 
t ion "the Dog. ''31 Since the term has this dual imposi t ion and signif icat ion,  it may sup- 
posit in a sentence for the animals  and not  for the constel lat ion or for the constel lat ion 
and not  for the animals .  The user may  have either the one or the other in mind  on  a 
g iven occasion.  Hence  the term is equivocal .  32 
A term is equivocal  in the second mode  (by analogy) if  and only  if it is g iven more  
than one imposi t ion at the same t ime in such a way that the imposi t ions are not  indepen-  
dent  of  one another but  rather one is pr imary and the rest are related in some way to it. 33 
This is the familiar  p r o s  h e n  equivocity.  As an example,  the term "man"  may  be pri- 
mari ly  imposed to signify human  beings  and also secondari ly imposed to signify statues 
or images of  human  beings  because the latter are related by resemblance  to the former. 34 
Just as for equivocat ion by chance,  since the te rm-can  have this dual  imposi t ion and 
signif icat ion,  it may supposit  in  a sentence for h u m a n  beings  and not  for their images or 
for the images and not  for the human  beings.  The user  may have either the one or the 
other in mind  on a given occasion.  Hence the term is equivocal .  35 
See above, nn. 22-23. 
3o Summa logicae, 111-4, 2, II. 48-53: "Primus modus est quando aliqua dictio est aequivoca a casu. 
Vocatur autem 'aequivocum a casu' quando dictio aeque primo---non semper quidem aeque primo tempoee 
sea intentione~pluribus impositionibus, vel una aequivalenti pluribus, imponitur ad siguificandum, ita scilicet 
quod una impositione imponitur ad siguificandum ac si non esset prius imposita." 
31 Ibid., II. 92-116. 
32 In II. 53-55, Ockham allows that a term may be called equivocal in this first mode with respect to 
different languages. That is, the diverse impositions need not belong to a single system of impositions consti- 
tuting a single spoken or written language. ("Sicut contingit quando eadem dictio est eadem in diversis idio- 
matibus, sicut haec dictio 'me' est Latinum et est Anglicum, ideo est aequivocum a casu.") 
33 Summa logicae, 111-4, 3, II. 2-8: "Circa secundum modum aequivocationis est sciendum quod tunc est 
secundus modus aequivocationis quando eadem dictio primo et principaliter imponitur ad significandum vel 
consignificandum aliquid vel aliqua, et secundario propter aliquam attributionem alterius rei ad primum signi- 
ficatum imponitur ad siguificandum aliud vel alia, ira quod in aliquibus propositionibus utimur illo vocabulo 
aliter quam primo erat institutum, et non in omnibus." 
Ibid., ll. 8-13: "Sicut est de isto nomine 'homo', quod primo erat impositum ad siguificandum animalia 
rationalia et secundo propter similitudinem statuae ad hominem utimur hoc nomine 'homo' pro statua in 
aliquibus propositionibus, sicut in talibus 'homo depingitur', 'homo est aureus vel argenteus', quando statua 
fit cx auro vel argento. 
35 Ockham stipulates another important difference between equivocation by chance and equivocation by 
analogy. Whereas a term that is equivocal by chance requires that every sentence in which it occurs be 
distinguished (at least if the equivocation occurs within a single language), a term that is equivocal by analogy 
requires that only certain sentences be distinguished in this way. Such a term may supposit according to its 
primary imposition in any sentence in which it occurs. But it may supposit according to one of its secondary 
impositions only if it is "matched" in a sentence with a term that is truly predicable of one of its secondary 
siguificates. See ibid., ll. 18-28: "Ex hoc oritur una regula talis, quod numquam est propositio distinguenda 
penes secundum modum aequivocationis nisi quando illud vocabulum quod potest sic aequivoce accipi compa- 
ratur alicui verificabili de secundario siguificato vel pro aliquo consimili. Et ideo ista est distinguenda 'homo 
depingitur' et non ista 'homo currit' nec ista 'homo est animal', et sic de aliis. Et huius ratio est quia semper 
terminus, ubicumque ponatur, potest stare pro suo primario siguificato, sed non potest semper stare pro suo 
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Note that a term is equivocal in one of  these first two modes only if it imposed to 
signify. But only conventional,  spoken or written terms are imposed to signify; mental 
terms or concepts signify naturally and not by imposition. It follows that only conven- 
tional terms and not mental terms can be equivocal in one of these first two modes. 
Already,  therefore, we have at least a weak form of  Trentman's  third claim: there is no 
equivocation in mental language according to the first or second mode. 
Ockham says as much in Summa logicae, I, 13, 36 where indeed the first two modes of  
equivocation are the only ones he considers. 37 There too he explains the relation be- 
tween conventionally equivocal terms in these first two modes and terms or concepts of  
mental language. Since imposition amounts to the subordination of  spoken or written 
terms to mental terms or concepts, an equivocal term in one of  the first two modes is 
just a term that is subordinated to more than one concept at the same time. 38 
It is perhaps hard to see how Ockham can reconcile all the things he says about these 
first two modes of  equivocation. If  a term supposits personally for what is signifies, and 
if a conventional term derives its signification from the concepts to which it is subordi- 
nated, then it would seem that a conventional term that is equivocal in one of  the first 
two modes and so is subordinated to more than one concept at the same time would 
supposit,  whenever it is used personally,  according to all its impositions at once and 
not, as Ockham says, according to one to the exclusion of  the rest. 
What  Ockham has in mind seems to be this. The user of  an equivocal term in one of  
the first two modes has adopted a certain set of  subordination conventions that map the 
term into more than one concept. Those conventions may be thought of  as dispositional 
or habitual in nature; they are related to what is called "linguistic competence."  Now 
just  as in the practical realm one may acquire diverse habits in such a way that on a 
given occasion one is disposed to adopt diverse courses of  action, even though only one 
course is in fact adopted and so only one habit exercised on that occasion, so too with 
language. The user of  an equivocal term has acquired diverse linguistic habits governing 
the use of  that term, but not all such habits need to be exercised every time the term is 
used. The distinction that is required in order to make out Ockham's  claim, then, is the 
distinction between dispositional and occurrent imposition or subordination, like the 
distinction between dispositional and occurrent knowledge and belief. 
It is clear in all of  this that mental language is an important part of  Ockham's  expla- 
nation of  the mechanism by which conventional terms can come to be equivocal in one 
of  the first two modes.  Equivocation occurs in those cases in which the subordination 
secundario significato, sed tanmm in propositione ubi comparatur alicui verificabili de suo secundario signifi- 
cato. Et ideo tantum talis propositio est distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis." 
~s Lines 10--12: "Est autem primo sciendum quod sola vox vel aliud signum ad placitum institutum est 
aequivocum vel univocum, et ideo intentio animae vel conceptus non est aequivocus nec univocus proprie 
loquendo." 
37 Ibid., 11.25-34: "Tale autem aequivocum est duplex. Unum est aequivocum a casu, quando scilicet vox 
pluribus conceptibus subordinatur, et ira uni ac si non subordinaretur alteri et ira significat unum ac si non 
significaret alius, sieur est de hoc nomine 'Sortes', quod imponitur pluribus hominibus. Aliud est aequivocum 
a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinatur uni conceptui et postea propter 
aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad aliquid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem imponitur illi 
alteri, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine 'homo'." 
38 Ibid., 11. 13-15: "Est autem vox ilia aequivoca quae significans plura non est signum subordinatum uni 
conceptui, sed est signum unum pluribus conceptibus seu intentionibus animae subordinatum." 
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relation is one-many. Since there is no higher language to which mental language is 
subordinated, these kinds of  equivocation cannot occur in mental language. 
There is perhaps another argument for this same conclusion, an argument that does 
not depend on Ockham's  defining the first two modes of  equivocation in terms of  im- 
position and so banishing them from mental language, as it were by f ia t .  These two 
modes exhaust the ways in which a term can be equivocal in virtue of  "diverse 
signification": either the diverse significations of  such a term are independent or they 
are not. Now since concepts are "natural l ikenesses" of  the things they signify, 39 a 
concept that had a "diverse s ignif ica t ion"-- for  instance, one that signified both canines 
and the constellation called "the Dog,"  or one that signified both human beings and 
their images - -wou ld  be a natural likeness of  all the things it signifies. It is hard to see 
how such a concept could possibly be called equivocal; rather it would be simply a 
broader concept than the concepts that signify only dogs or only the constellation "the 
Dog,"  only men or only their images. Somewhat similarly, a disjunctive term in 
spoken language (e .g . ,  the term "instrument for writing or drawing with ink, or else a 
fenced enclosure for animals") must be sharply distinguished from a term signifying 
the two disjuncts equivocally (e .g . ,  "pen"). 
The first two modes of  equivocation fit the general definition in terms of  "diverse 
signification" that Ockham rejects at the beginning of  Summa logicae,  111-4, 2. The 
third mode,  however,  does not fit, and it is this that leads Ockham to adopt his alter- 
native general definition in terms of  supposition. In effect Ockham defines the third 
mode of  equivocation (equivocation by context) in such a way that a term is equivocal 
in this mode if  and only if  it is equivocal (that is, can supposit for diverse things in 
such a way that it can supposit for one and not the other) but not in either of  the first 
two modes (that is, not in virtue of  diverse signification or imposition). This happens 
when a term that is not given diverse impositions occurs in a context  together with 
other words that may affect its supposition in a way that produces equivocation. 4~ 
Ockham gives examples and rules for two main kinds of  such contexts: (1) those that 
allow a term to supposit either simply or materially, or both, in addition to suppositing 
personally,  and (2 ) tense  and modal contexts, which produce what other authors 
called "ampliation."41 
39 There are notorious difficulties in explicating this similarity between concepts and their significates. But 
these difficulties do not affect the argument. The point is merely that concepts always signify the same things 
(in the second mode of signification distinguished in Summa logicae, I, 33). 
4o Summa logicae, III-4, 4, 11. 2-8: "Circa tertinm modum aeqnivocationis est primo sciendum quod tunc 
est terfius modus aequivocationis quando dictio non accipitur pro diversis significatis, sed ex hoc solum quod 
alicui comparatur quod non plus pertinent ad primarium significatum quam ad secundarium. Et iste modus non 
accidit ex hoe quod vox potest significare diversa, sicut contingit in duobus primis modis, sed ex hoc quod 
eadem vox potest supponere pro diversis." The fLrst sentence of this passage presents obvious difficulties both 
of syntax and of interpretation. Ought one to understand "est aeqnivocatio" after "sed"? Again, if, as the first 
halves of both sentences say, the equivocal term is not taken with diverse significations, then why does the 
second half of the fast sentence refer to primary and secondary significates? 
41 See Alfonso Maler0, Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1972), 
chap. 2. In Summa logicae, Ill-4, 4, 11. 106-12, Ockham also allows a third kind of context to produce this 
mode of equivocation. ("Alia regula est quod quando eadem dictio potest esse diversorum casuum, generum 
vel numerorum vel aliorum accidentium grammaticalium, ilia propositio est distinguenda penes tertium mo- 
dum aequivocationis. Sicut ista 'isti asini sunt episcopi', eo quod li episcopi potest esse nominativi casus vel 
genitivi. Vemmtamen in tali paralogismo potest frequenter assignari primus modus aequivocationis; sed 
quando hoc habeat fled et quando non, propter brevitatem omitto.") 
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The  rules govern ing  the first kind o f  context  42 I have e lsewhere  cal led col lec t ive ly  
" O c k h a m ' s  Rule  o f  Supposi t ion.  ''43 They  are presented also in summary  fashion in 
S u m m a  l o g i c a e ,  I, 65: 
This rule, therefore, can be given, that when a term able to have the above three kinds of supposi- 
tion [namely, personal, simple, and material] is matched with an extreme common to incomplex 
or complex [expressions], whether spoken or written, the term can always have material or per- 
sonal supposition, and such a sentence is to be distinguished. When it is matched with an extreme 
signifying an intention of the soul, it is to be distinguished insofar as it can have simple or 
personal supposition. But when it is matched with an extreme common to all the above, then it is 
to be distinguished insofar as it can have simple, material, or personal supposition. 44 
The  rules govern ing  the second kind o f  context  are these: 
The fourth rule is that when a common term supposits personally and is a subject with respect 
to a verb about the past, the sentence is to be distinguished insofar as the subject term can 
supposit for things that are or for things that were. Thus this is to be distinguished "Some boy was 
old," insofar as "boy" can supposit for him who is a boy, and then [the sentence] is equivalent to 
"Someone who now is a boy was old," or it can supposit for him who was a boy, and then the 
sense is "Someone who was a boy was o l d . " . . .  
The fifth rule is that when a common term suppositing personally is a subject with respect to a 
verb about the future, the sentence is to be distinguished according to the third mode of equivoca- 
tion, insofar as the subject can supposit for things that are or for things that will be. 
The sixth rule is that when a common term suppositing personally is a subject with respect to a 
verb about the possible or about the contingent, the sentence is to be distinguished insofar as the 
subject term can stand for things that are or for things that can be or for things that are cont- 
ingent. 45 
The  rules for these two kinds o f  contexts  present a p rob lem for T ren tman ' s  third 
c la im.  For  sentences o f  the kinds governed by these rules wiU certainly occur  in menta l  
42 Summa logicae, Ill-4, 4, 11. 10-86. 
43 Spade, "Ockham's Rule of Supposition." 
44 Lines 43--51: "Potest igitur daft ista regula quod quando terminus potens habere praedictam triplicem 
suppositionem comparatur extremo, communi incomplexis vel complexis, sive prolatis sive scriptis, semper 
terminus potest habcre suppositionem materialem vel personalem; et est talis propositio distinguenda. Quando 
vero comparatur extremo significanti intentionem animae, est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere supposi- 
tionem simplicem re! personalem. Quando autem comparatur extremo communi omnibus praedictis, tunc est 
distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem personalem, simplicem vel materialem." See also the 
passages from Ockham's Expositio in Sophisticos elenchos Aristotelis quoted by Philotheus Bochner, 
"Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Troth," in his Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius 
M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1958), pp. 232-67, nn. 19, 24-26. 
4s Summa logicae, III-4, 11.4, 87-105: "Quarta regula est quando terminus communis supponit personaliter 
et subicitur respectu verbi de praeterito, ilia propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus subiectus potest 
supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuemnt. Sicut haec est distinguenda 'aliquis puer fuit senex', eo 
quod li puer potest supponere pro eo qui est puer, et tunc aequivalet isti 'aliquis, qui modo est puer, fuit 
senex'; vel potest supponere pro eo qui fuit puer, et tunc est sensus 'aliquis, qui fuit puer, fuit s e n e x ' . . . .  
Quinta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter subicitur respectu verbi de futuro, 
ina propositio est distinguenda penes tertinm modum aequivocationis, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro 
his quae sunt vel pro his quae erunt. Sexta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter 
subicitur respectu verbi de possibili vel de contingenti, ilia propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus 
subiectus potest stare pro his quae sunt vei pro his quae possunt essc vel pro his quae contingunt esse." See 
also Summa logicae, I, 72, U. 37-112; and II, 7. 
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language. 46 If  the rules continue to apply there, they will introduce equivocation into 
mental language. 
Indeed, Ockham explicitly allows this. In Summa logicae, Ill-4, 4, he says: 
And it must be noted that this third mode of equivocation can be found in a purely mental 
sentence, although the fast two modes have no place except among signs instituted by conven 
tion. Hence the mental sentence 'Man is a species' can be distinguished insofar as the subject can 
supposit significatively [i.e., personally]or for itself [i.e., simply]. And the same thing must be 
said in similar casesY 
Again in Summa logicae, I, 64, he says: 
Now just as such a diversity of supposition can apply to a spoken or written term, so too it can 
apply to a mental term, because an intention can supposit for that which it signifies, for itself, for 
an utterance and for an inscription. 4s 
If  this claim is allowed to stand, it would of course refute Trentman's third claim. But it 
probably ought not to be allowed to stand. Ockham's  statements here should not be 
regarded as his "better doctrine." 
In effect, Ockham's  rules provide that sentences producing the third mode of  equivo- 
cation have alternative sets of  truth conditions. When such a sentence is disambiguated 
in one way, it is true under one set of  circumstances, and when it is disambiguated in 
another way, it is true under another set of  circumstances. Either set of  truth conditions 
may be applied without the other. 49 It is easy to see how this kind of  situation might 
arise in spoken or written language. There the sentence might simply be subordinated to 
more than one mental sentence, although the equivocal term in that sentence is subordi- 
nated to only a single concept? 5~ But it is much harder to see how such a situation could 
arise in mental language. One can of  course have a mental sentence that is true under 
one set of  circumstances or under another. But that is to have simply one disjunctive set 
of  truth conditions, not alternative sets any one of  which may be applied without the 
other. 
In order to allow the third mode of  equivocation in mental language, one would have 
to suppose that the truth or falsehood of  some mental sentences is not determined solely 
by the ingredients and structures of  the sentences themselves, on the one hand, and by 
'~ Indeed, Ockham explicfly says that tense is a feature of  mental verbs. See Summa logicae, I, 3, II. 
69--72, 81-82; also Quodlibet 5, q. 8, 3rd conclusion, fols. 76vb-77ra. 
47 Lines 113-18: "Et est notandum quod iste tertius modus aequivocationis potest reperiri in proposifione 
pure mentali, quamvis duo primi modi non habeant locum nisi in signis ad placitum institutis. Uncle ista 
propositio mentalis 'homo est species' distingui potest, eo quod subiectum potest supponere significative vel 
pro se ipso. Et sic de consimilibus est dicendum." Professor Calvin Normore fwst called this passage to my 
attention. 
Lines 56-59: "Sicut autem talis diversitas suppositionis potest competere termino vocali et scripto, ita 
etiam potest competere termino mentali, quia intentio potest supponere pro illo quod significat et pro se ipsa et 
pro voce et pro scripto." 
(9 This also holds for the first two modes of equivocation, and indeed for the three modes of  amphiboly as 
well (see Summa logicae, In-4, 5-7). The arguments in this and the following paragraphs may also be applied 
rautatis mutandis against the possibility of there being any kind of equivocation or amphiboly in mental 
language. 
5o This would require that the subordination relation be able to map a whole conventional expression into 
something other than the sum of the mappings of its parts. 
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the ar rangement  o f  things in the world ,  on the other.  Rather ,  a third factor is also 
required: some factor  that determines ,  in cases where  there are al ternatives,  the things 
for which  the terms in the sentences are to supposit.  What  could  such a factor be? 
The  only suggest ion I have to offer  is to suppose some kind o f  dist inct ion be tween  a 
disposi t ional  and an occurrent  assigning of  supposit ion,  to parallel  the dis t inct ion be- 
tween disposi t ional  and occurrent  subordinat ion or  imposi t ion sketched above.  On  this 
v i ew,  then,  a mental  sentence involv ing  equivoca t ion  in the third mode  wou ld  be  one  
the user  o f  which  has acquired a disposi t ion to assign the equivoca l  te rm in the sen- 
tence one  set o f  supposi ta ,  and also a disposi t ion to assign it another  set o f  supposita.  
On  any g iven  occas ion ei ther one o f  these sets may  be actual ly assigned wi thout  the 
other.  An  analogous trick will  not  a l low equivoca t ion  in the first two modes  into men-  
tal language,  because  concepts  s ignify naturally and a lways  s ignify the same things. 51 
But ,  as far as I know,  O c k h a m  nowhere  clearly says that concepts  supposit  naturally 
and always for the same things. Indeed,  in the passages quoted  above ,  he expl ici t ly  
denies  it. 52 
It is not  c lear  to me  what  it would  be like to "ass ign"  supposi t ion to a concept  in 
the manner  required by this theory.  Perhaps the notion s imply makes  no sense. In any 
case one  ought  not  to be too eager  to embrace  such a theory in order  to save Ock-  
h a m ' s  statements about  the third mode  of  equivocat ion  in mental  language.  For  in ad- 
dit ion to making  out jus t  how such equivoca t ion  can occur  there at all,  there are at 
least two other  difficulties.  
First ,  O c k h a m ' s  rules governing  the third mode  of  equivoca t ion  contain certain pe- 
culiar  biases. The  "Ru le  o f  Suppos i t ion ,"  for instance,  contains a bias in favor  o f  per- 
sonal supposit ion.  53 And  the rules for tenses and modal i ty  contain a bias in favor  o f  
the present  assertoric.  ~ But why  should this be so? This kind o f  situation looks suspi- 
c iously l ike the second mode  of  equivoca t ion  (by analogy) ,  which  does  not  occur  in 
~ See the argument above, in the text to which n. 39 is appended. 
52 In Summa Iogicae, I, 1, 11. 19-21, he does say that a concept or intention of the soul is "nata" (apt by 
nature) to be a part of a mental sentence and "nata" to supposit there for what it naturally signifies ("Terminus 
conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars pro- 
positionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere"). But it is not clear how strongly "nata" is to be taken here. 
On the view sketched above, I can see no way to avoid making the dispositions to assign a certain supposition 
innate. If they are not innate, Ockham's ontology and psychology seem to allow no other way for the disposi- 
tions to be acquired naturally. Hence if they are not innate, then mental language, at least at the level of 
supposition (and so of truth), is not after all the universal language of thought, the same for everyone. Rather, 
it is to some extent conventional. This is certainly an unorthodox interpretation, although I can find no text to 
rule it out definitively. Moreover, once a degree of conventionality is allowed into mental language, it is hard 
to see how Ockham can confine the third mode of equivocation there to the several limited contexts allowed in 
IU-4, 4. Why could one not, in a spirit of perversity, acquire a disposition to make the concept 'man' supposit 
in certain mental sentences only for asses? In order to avoid such consequences, it seems one would have to 
hold that the dispositions to assign supposition are innate. 
33 A term may supposit personally in any context, but simply or materially only in certain special circum- 
stances. See above, n. 44. 
A term may supposit in any context for the things of which it may be truly predicted by means of a 
present-tensed assertoric coupla. It may supposit for the things of which it may be truly predicated by means 
of a past- or future-tensed or modal copula only in certain special circumstances (see Summa logicae, I, 72, 
U. 37-112). Note that these rules appear to make sense only in the context of personal supposition. (Note the 
restrictions to personal supposition in the texts in n. 45, above.) Ockham does not appear to have taken 
account of tensed or modal sentences with terms in simple or material supposition (e.g., "Man was a 
species"). 
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mental  language.  55 There is nothing in the theory of  the third mode of  equivocat ion,  as 
Ockham develops it, to explain such biases. 56 
More serious, however ,  is the second difficulty. It does not concern tense and modal-  
ity, but  rather the c la im that concepts or mental  terms may have simple or material  
supposit ion.  Since concepts signify just  what is conceived by them that is, jus t  what 
they are thoughts o f - - a n d  since in general  it is only  in personal supposit ion that terms 
supposit  for what  they signify,  it follows that if mental  terms may have simple or mate- 
rial supposit ion,  we do not  always know what we are asserting in a mental  sentence.  If, 
for instance,  in the mental  sentence ' M a n  is a species '  the subjec t  has simple supposi- 
t ion so that the sentence asserts truly that the concept ' m a n '  is a species, nevertheless 
that is not  what we think when we formulate that sentence.  For the subject concept  
' m a n '  s i gn i f i e s - - and  so is a thought o f - - m e n ,  not itself. Therefore,  if mental  language 
is to be the language of  thought,  so that to say in mental  language that p is jus t  to 
entertain the thought that p ,  then all supposit ion in mental  language must  be personal.  
There is no place there for simple or material  supposit ion,  despite what Ockham says. 57 
Spoken or written sentences in which terms are equivocal  with respect to personal,  
s imple,  and material  supposi t ion are then subordinated to several mental  sentences at 
once,  with distinct concepts in the place of  equivocal  spoken or written terms. Thus the 
spoken sentence "Man  is a species" is subordinated to two mental  sentences,  one with 
the c o n c e p t / m a n '  as subject  and the other with the concept o f  that concept  as subject.  
This,  then,  is the theory I think Ockham ough t  to have had. It seems to me that the 
very not ion of  mental  language requires that there be only  personal  supposi t ion there, 
55 For the second mode, we have the rule (Summa Iogicae, 111-4, 3, 11. 23-26): "A term always, wherever 
it occurs, can stand for its primary significate. On the other hand, it cannot always stand for its secondary 
significate, but only in a sentence where it is matched with some term truly predicable of its secondary 
significate." (For the Latin, see n. 35 above.) Walter Burleigh in fact treats tensed sentences, for which he 
gives rules essentially the same as Ockham's, as involving equivocation in the second mode. See the rules in 
his De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior with a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior, ed. Philotheus 
Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), p. 49, 11. 23-31, and the remarks in 
"Walter Burley's Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias," ed. Stephen F. Brown, Franciscan Studies 34 
(1974), para. 5.31-5.35. He also explicitly says that it is the second mode that is involved in his "Rule of 
Supposition." See De puritate, p. 10, 11. 21-25: "Sed tamen huiusmodi propositiones: 'Homo est species', 
'Homo est disyllabum', sunt muliplices penes secundum modum aequivocationis, ex eo quod ille terminus 
'homo' potest habere suppositionem personalem vel simpliciem vel materialem." In "Ockham's Rule of Sup- 
position," p. 65, n. 7, I wrote that "it is hard to see how Burley thinks that the sentences he mentions are 
equivocal in this mode." I no longer find it so hard to see; the second mode is the only one of the three in 
which the kind of bias involved in these rules is given a theoretical rationale. 
Recall the difficulties we had with Ockham's definition of that third mode. See above, n. 40. 
57 I have used related considerations to make a somewhat different point in my "Some Epistemological 
Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute," Franciscan Studies 35 (1975) : 212-22, at sec. 3. 
~8 Summulae dialecticae, tract. 7, as quoted by Sten Ebbesen, "The Summulae, Tractatus VII: De fallaciis," 
in The Logic of John Buridan, ed. Jan Pinborg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1976), pp. 139-60, at p. 
156: "Sciendum est ergo, ut mihi videtur, quod suppositio materialis non est nisi ratione vocis significativae: 
nullus enim terminus in propositione mentali supponit materialiter, sed semper personaliter, quia non utimur 
terminis mentalibus ad placitum, sicut vocihus et scripturis, numquam enim eadem oratio mentalis diversas 
significationes vel acceptiones habet: eaedem enim omnibus passiones animae sunt et etiam res qua.rum ipsae 
sunt similitudines, ut habetur primo Peri Hermeneias. Unde ego dico quod propositio mentalis correspondens 
huic propositioni prout est vera 'homo est species' non est propositio in qua subicitur conceptus specificus 
hominum, sed est propositio in qua subicitur conceptus quo concipitur conceptus specificus hominum, et ille 
iam supponit non pro se, sed pro conceptu specifico hominum; ex quo satis patet quod praedicti paralogismi 
secundum talem mutationem suppositionum pertinet ad fallacias in dictione." Ebbesen's paper contains much 
interesting information on Buridan's theory of equivocation. 
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contrary to what Ockham says. John Buridan realized this, 58 as did Peter of Ailly. ~9 It 
seems to me also that Ockham ought not to have allowed equivocation in mental lan- 
guage in the case of tensed and modal sentences. Such a doctrine requires very dubious 
and perhaps untenable philosophical assumptions, as we have seen. Once again, Buri- 
dan has a view that seems preferable. Whereas Ockham holds that tensed and modal 
contexts allow a term to supposit equivocally for alternative sets of supposita, Buridan 
maintains that such contexts make a term supposit for the union of those sets. 6~ 
IV. We have seen that Ockham's theory of mental language runs into difficulties 
with respect to all three of Trentman's  claims; in this regard at least Ockham appears not 
to have realized all the consequences of what he was saying. While it is perhaps philo- 
sophically acceptable to restrict the grammatical features of mental language to those 
that affect truth conditions, it is not acceptable to identify the grammatical features of 
mental language, as Ockham does, with exactly those that affect truth conditions. Ock- 
ham then still owes us a satisfactory account of mental grammar. Furthermore, although 
he recognizes that there can be no synonymy in mental language, Ockham appears to 
have forgotten this when he allowed mental names to be distinguished into concrete and 
abstract. Finally, although Ockham explicitly allows the "third mode" of equivocation in 
mental language, there appears to be no coherent and plausible way to make this out. 
Such equivocation with respect to simple and material supposition is simply out of place 
in a language that is to be the language of thought, while with respect to tense and 
modality it involves a tampering with mental supposition in ways that are not very 
plausible or even very clear. 
All this indicates that Ockham's notion of mental language was not very thoroughly 
worked out. However interesting, suggestive, or even important we may find the theory 
today, it was perhaps not the center and focus of Ockham's own logical thought to the 
extent that it has been of much of our own thinking about Ockham. 6~ 
Indiana University 
Conceptus et insolubilia (Paris: Pierre le Dru for Durland Gerlier, [ca. 1495], Copinger 391), foi. 5vb: 
"Infertur r quod quia terminus mentalis proprie dictus in propositione mentali semper naturaliter accipi- 
tur pro re quam ultimate significat naturaliter proprie, ideo semper supponit pro suo significato ultimato, 
semper personaliter supponit et numquam materialiter." Peter of Mantua even appears to have said that all 
supposition is personal in any language (including spoken or written language?), although his reasoning is a 
bit obscure. See Peter (Alboinus) of Mantua, Logica (Venice: Simon Bevilaqua, 1 Dec. 1492, Goff P-501), 
fol. 2rb: "Et quia nulla est suppositio nisi personalis, ideo potest dici pro regula quod omnis terminus 
supponens supponit personaliter." 
~o Thus whereas for Ockham the sentence "B will be A" is true in one sense if and only if what is now B 
will be A, and a'ue in another sense if and only if what will be B will be A, for Buridan the sentence "B will be 
A" is tree (simpliciter) if and only if what is or will be B will be A. See lohannis Buridani Tractatus de 
consequentiis, ed. Hubert Hubien (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1976), I, 8, 11. 363-69: "Notandum 
est quod propositio de subiecto ampliato per praedicatum expondenda est per disiunctionem in subiecto tempo- 
ris praesentis ad tempus vel tempora ad quod vel ad quae fit ampliatio, ut 'B erit A' 'quod est vel erit Berit 
A', et "homo est mortuus" 'qui est vel fuit homo r mortuus', et 'antichristus potest esse homo' 'qui est vel 
potest esse antichristus potest esse homo', et 'rosa intelligitur' 'quod est vel fuit vel erit vel potest esse rosa 
intelligitur'." See also Johannes Buridanu~: Sophismata, ed. T. K. Scott (Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog, 
1977), Ca. 5; trans, in T. K. Scott, John Buridan: Sophisr~ on Meaning and Truth (New York: Appleton- 
Century-Crofts, 1966), pp. 144-57. 
61 See above, n. 7. 
